Teheran Eats Itself

For starters, you have to give Iran some credit. As a state that is undoubtedly theocratic, to hold elections that go beyond the Islamist tenet of “one man, one vote, once” might be considered an accomplishment, allegations of fraud notwithstanding. [As we know all too well, a polity need not be theocratic in nature to engage in voter fraud.]

As I’ve hinted at repeatedly in this forum, one of the reasons I am convinced that the American military misadventure in Iraq has been so damaging is that it has taken away resources that could have been used in operations against more dangerous players, like Iran. This would have been one such scenario, a perfect opportunity for the United States to use something other than simple diplomatic persuasion to better forward two of its stated interests: one, to better facilitate the viability of democratic institutions in the Middle East; and, two, to improve relations with the Islamic world. And, if we weren’t necessarily going to shore up an ostensibly duly elected Islamic regime, we could have taken advantage of an emerging power vacuum, reduce the influence of the Mullahs, and certainly done no worse than we’ve done in Iraq, especially since the initial crisis would have been of the Iranians’ own making.

As it is, the developing conflict provides an opportunity for the United States to experiment with it newly stated foreign policy approach of appeasing Islam, and to better gauge the possibilities inherent in an Islamic society tearing itself apart without it being our responsibility, as it became in Iraq. Obviously, American military options vis-a-vis influencing election outcomes are off the table. However, a wait-and-see approach with the most overt response being nothing more than the most lukewarm of diplomatic protests against the alleged electoral improprieties allows for the possibility that if Madma-dinejad is declared the winner and invited to form the next government, the Iranian streets will spill over and become too much for Tehran to handle.

The worst thing we can do, of course, is send Jimmy Carter to broker a compromise that maintains the status quo. That would serve as the strongest possible indicator of appeasement being US policy. One can only hope that option remains considered politically untenable.

As far as I’m concerned, though, the best possible outcome would be for the Israelis to take advantage of the bungled transmission of power and start bombing the nuclear sites now, or at least when it becomes increasingly clear that Tehran is too self-involved to truly present a unified response. One can expect that any aggressive Israeli action will unite the populace behind whoever is in power, because neither candidate is exactly philo-Semitic. However, taking advantage of the Persian power vacuum, while it would not mute the international diplomatic opprobrium that would emanate from all corners of the globe, would certainly serve to make any Iranian response less coherent and cohesive than it otherwise might be.

And, just like with Osirak in 1981, the world will thank the Israelis. [Under their breath, of course.]